The Second Siege of Limerick

The raising of the siege and William's departure did not bring the campaigning to a close. In September the Williamites attacked Cork and Kinsale, and by early October both had surrendered. The onset of winter did, however, bring a lull in the fighting, and though there were occasional skirmishes along the of the Shannon, no major engagement took place until the following summer

In May 1691 a French convoy arrived at Limerick bring much-needed munitions and supplies, and also a general, St Ruth, who had been appointed by James to take charge of the army in Ireland. St Ruth was an efficient officer and a strict disciplinarian and he soon had the irish army drilled into shape. His confidence inspired those around him, and when serious hostilities reopened in June there was a new sense of optimism in the Irish camp.

Ginkel's strategy for the new campaigning season was to force a passage of the Shannon and bring the irish army to battle. This time however he avoided Limerick and decided to try his luck upriver at Athlone. The assault on Athlone opened in mid-June, but despite subjecting the town to two weeks' intense bombardment, Ginkel's army was unable to dislodge the Irish form the Connaught side of the town.

Then, on the evening of 30 June, a surprise attack was launched using a ford in the river, and within a few hours Athlone

With the line of the Shannon breached St. Ruth now decide to risk all in a pitched battle.. To this end he concentrated the irish army west of Ballinasloe in a fine defensive position centred around the hill of Aughrim. Ginkel's army arrived at Aughrim on 11 July, and the decisive battle of the campaign occurred on the following day. This time the Irish infantry gave a good account of themselves, and the outcome of the battle was in doubt until late in the day. However, at a critical juncture in the fighting, St Ruth was struck by a cannonball and killed. His death turned the tide in the Williamites'' favour. Leaderless, the Irish army lost its cohesion, and what had at one moment seemed an Irish victory quickly turned into defeat. However, the onset of nightfall prevented a worse rout than in fact ensued, and though Irish casualties were severe, the bulk of the army escaped to fight again. Within a week most of the survivors had assembled at Limerick.

The campaign now entered its final phase. Ten days after Aughrim, Galway surrendered to Ginkel, so that by the end of July Limerick was the only town of significance in Irish hands. Since the previous siege the Irish army had suffered a series of major setbacks, and this was reflected in the morale of the garrison as they prepared once more to defend Limerick. Hope now rested on the expectation of fresh help from abroad, and immediately after Aughrim messengers had been dispatched to France pleading for men and material.
Having captured Galway, Ginkel re-crossed the Shannon at Banagher, and proceeded via Nenagh to Limerick, where the main body of his army arrived on 25 August. Meanwhile morale in the Irish camp had been dealt two further blows: late in July a senior officer, Brigadier Henry Luttrell, was arrested and court-matialled for corresponding with the enemy; and then, just a few weeks later, the Earl of Tyrconnell suddenly fell ill and died, sparking strong rumours that he had been poisoned.

With a smaller force than Willliam had commanded the previous year, Ginkel had little chance of taking Limerick by storm. Moreover, the city's defences had been improved since the last siege with the help of French engineering skill. The breach in the Irish town wall had been mended and massive earthen banks erected behind the wall to reinforce it. Stronger outworks had also been constructed around the walls giving them futher protection and rendering an assault even more difficult. The fact that the campaigning season was drawing to a close did not favour Ginkel either. It was difficult to move artillery at the best of times, but, in wet weather, almost impossible. Also,as the weather deteriorated, his men would suffer more, being camped in open country. Ginkel, therefore was anxious to bring hostilities to a close as quickly as possible, though how to effect this while Limerick remained virtually unassailable was not at all clear.

The second Williamite siege of Limerick opened, like the first, on the Irish town side of the city. Once again the Irish did not defend their outlying positions with any great degree of vigour, and by the end of the day Ginkel's infantry had succeeded in driving them back to the main defences of the city. On this occasion, however, the Williamites established their camp more to the west and closer to the Shannon than they had done the previous year. one reason for this was that the English had a fleet in the Shannon, and it was Ginkel's intention to keep in close contact with it. Also, from their new position the Williamite gunners would be able to direct fire into the English town, which was destined to receive the brunt of the cannonading during the siege.

Ginkel's artillery arrived on the 26 August, but due to the state of the ground it was four days before a battery was put in place. Its fire was directed at Thomond Bridge and King John's Castle (18). Meanwhile the besiegers had built themselves a defensive line stretching from Singland ridge in the east to close by the river in the west. Ginkel made no real progress in the first two weeks of the siege. He seems to have been daunted by the defences of the Irish town, and, with memories of the disastrous assault of 1690 but a year old, was unwilling to essay a similar onslaught. Early in September the focus of his operations switched from the extreme left to the extreme right. Ginkel, having received information that the walls of the English town facing the Abbey River were not particularly strong, decided to site a battery across the river north of present-day O'Dwyer Bridge. Again, the terrain was not very suitable, but the battery was in position by 8 Septemer. This battery packed a formidable punch, being made up of 24-pound and 18-pound siege guns plus a number of lighter field pieces and some heavy mortars as well. Within a few hours of opening fire it had succeeded in making a breach in the English town wall where it skirted the present-day island Road. The Williamites now began to assemble floats to be used to transport an assault force across the river. But on the night of the 9 September a raiding party of Irish crossed over from the King's Island and destroyed many of the floats. Despite this setback, Ginkel's artillery continued to bombard the wall and within two days the breach had been widened to about forty yards. But though the artillery had done its work, no attempt was made to assault the breach. Obviously Ginkel was conscious of the difficulties and dangers involved in trying to launch an attack across water, and, rather than run the risk of failure, he preferred to adopt a cautious approach

In mid-September Ginkel switched the focus of his operations again. He now decided to send a force across the Shannon, possibly with a view to blockading the city. On the evening to 15 September a large party of Williamites set to work constructing a pontoon brige at Lanahrone (16), a few hundred yards upriver from present-day Athlunkard Bridge. By the following morning the bridge was completed and a party of Williamites crossed over to secure the far bank. This operation could not have been successfully executed had the Irish cavalry on the Clare side of the river attended to its duty, but no attempt was made to stop the Williamites until it was too late

With a foothold on the north bank of the Shannon the Williamites were now in a position to invest Limerick on all sides and impose a total blockade. However, Ginkel was hopful that this might not be necessary and that the garrison might be induced to capitulate without the need to resort to further violence. On 16 September he issued a proclamation offering generous terms to the garrison if they would surrender, but with the menacing proviso that if the terms were not accepted within eight days, those who held out would 'be answerable for the blood and destruction they draw upon themselves'. The following day, having received no answer to his proclamation, Ginkel held a council of war at which it was decided to exploit the bridgehead on the north bank. Such a policy was not without risks, as the Irish being centrally located could switch their infantry from one end of Limerick to the other in a short time, and might well take advantge of a reduction in Ginkel's strengh before the Irish town by sallying in force. The Williamites took elaborate precautions to counter such an eventuality: the field defences facing the Irish town were stengthened, and a fesh battery established near Singland where it could cover a sally from John's Gate

By 22 September preparations for an attack in force across the Shannon were complete. In the meantime the pontoon brige had been moved about half a mile downstream, near to the present site of the old Corbally baths. Ginkel engaged the best part of his army for this expedition, including ten regiments of infantry and nearly all of the cavalry and dragoons. By that afternoon they had crossed into Clare and proceeded to swing left around the bend of the Shannon towards some Irish outer defences covering the approaches to Thomond Bridge. Some reinforcements from the city were sent to strengthen these defences, but after a sharp fight the Irish were forced to give way. With their positions overrun there was nothing for the few hundred defenders to do but flee towards Thomond Bridge and the sanctuary of the English town. Unfortunately, the Irish were so closely pursued that the French officer in command of the drawbrige raised it too soon, being afraid that the Williamites would capture the bridge as well, and a large number of the garrison were trapped on the wrong side. A terrible slaughter ensued. Being so closly packed together they had little opportunity of defending themselves. Many tried to surrender, but the Williamites would not give quarter. Those who were not butchereddr on the bridge were forced over the sides or fell into the gap where the drawbridge had been raised. The Irish lost about six hundred in this brief action, of whom about a quarter were drowned.

This latest disaster had a profound influence on the morale of the garrison. Relations between the Irish and French officers, never particularly harmonious, were futher strained due to the fact that it was a French major who had raised the drawbridge. That night a council of war was held at which it was decided to call for a truce and look for terms from Ginkel. Though futher resistance was certainly possible, the events of that day, and of the previous week, had left the garrison with little enthusiasm for continuing the fight. They had held out for over a month, but now, completely cut off from the surrounding countryside, and with no sign of furthter help arriving from France, a prolongation of the siege must have seemed pointless. And so on the afternoon of 23 September the Irish drums sounded a parley in both the Irish and English towns, and soon after the guns around Limerick fell silent.